Introduction
In Eric Schlosser's "Command and Control," we embark on a harrowing journey through the history of nuclear weapons, from their inception during World War II to the present day. This eye-opening book reveals the terrifying reality of how close we've come to nuclear catastrophe on numerous occasions, not just from intentional use but from accidents, miscalculations, and human error.
Schlosser's meticulously researched narrative weaves together the scientific, political, and military aspects of nuclear weapons development and management. He paints a vivid picture of the constant tension between the need for nuclear deterrence and the ever-present risk of accidental detonation or unauthorized use.
As we delve into the key ideas of this book, we'll explore the creation of the first atomic bombs, the escalation of the Cold War arms race, and the numerous close calls that have brought us to the brink of nuclear disaster. We'll also examine the ongoing challenges of maintaining and securing nuclear arsenals in an increasingly complex world.
The Birth of the Atomic Age
The Manhattan Project and the First Nuclear Bomb
The story of nuclear weapons begins with the Manhattan Project, a top-secret initiative during World War II that brought together brilliant scientists from the United States, Britain, and Canada. Their mission was to develop an atomic bomb before Nazi Germany could do so.
In July 1945, the culmination of their efforts was assembled in a small New Mexico farmhouse. The first nuclear bomb contained a plutonium core surrounded by high explosives, all designed to create an unprecedented chain reaction explosion.
The scientists had discovered that two materials could cause this kind of explosion: uranium-235 and plutonium-239. These elements have a high proton count, making them ideal for initiating a fission reaction – the splitting of atoms that releases massive amounts of energy.
The bomb's design was ingenious yet terrifying. It required all 32 explosives surrounding the core to detonate simultaneously, a feat achieved through Donald Horning's X-Unit, an electronic triggering device. The bomb resembled a large soccer ball, with its core encased in 12 pentagons and 20 hexagons of explosives.
On July 17, 1945, the first test of this weapon produced a mushroom cloud that rose eight miles into the sky. The sight and sound were so overwhelming that one technician believed he was witnessing doomsday itself.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Deadly Debut
With the successful test behind them, the next question was how to use this new weapon to end the war with Japan. Some advocated for a public demonstration in an unpopulated area, but concerns about a potential failure led to a different decision.
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb, codenamed "Little Boy," on Hiroshima. This uranium-based weapon, despite containing less than a gram of fissile material, unleashed an explosion equivalent to 12-18 kilotons of TNT.
When Japan didn't immediately surrender, a second bomb, "Fat Man," was dropped on Nagasaki just three days later. This plutonium-based weapon was even more powerful, yielding an explosion equivalent to 21 kilotons of TNT.
These two bombings led to Japan's unconditional surrender, bringing an end to World War II but ushering in a new era of nuclear anxiety.
The Cold War and the Nuclear Arms Race
Civilian Oversight and Military Ambitions
In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world grappled with how to control this new, devastating technology. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established civilian oversight of America's nuclear program through the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. However, this civilian control would be constantly challenged by military officials pushing for greater influence.
The Cold War Escalates
The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union set the stage for a dangerous nuclear arms race. Two key events in particular heightened tensions: the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 and their successful test of their first nuclear bomb in 1949.
These developments led the United States to adopt a strategy of "atomic blitz" in case of a Soviet invasion of Europe. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was formed to prepare for potential nuclear strikes.
Bigger and More Powerful Bombs
As the Cold War progressed, both sides raced to develop more powerful nuclear weapons. The United States moved from the Mark 3 bombs used in World War II to increasingly sophisticated designs:
- The Mark 4, which stored its nuclear core separately and had a safer detonation device.
- The Mark 6, ten times more powerful than its predecessor.
- The Mark 7, smaller and lighter but equally powerful.
The ultimate goal for both sides was the development of the hydrogen bomb. The United States conducted its first full-scale test of a liquid-fueled H-bomb in 1952, producing an explosion 500 times more powerful than the Nagasaki bomb. This was followed by the famous Bikini Atoll test of a solid-fueled H-bomb in 1954, yielding a staggering 15 megatons.
The Soviet Union wasn't far behind, testing their own thermonuclear device, the RDS-6, in August 1953.
The Growing Risks of Nuclear Accidents
Preparedness and Its Perils
The Strategic Air Command took its role very seriously, implementing countless checklists and endless drills to ensure rapid response in case of a nuclear attack. However, this constant state of readiness came with significant risks.
Nuclear weapons were routinely loaded and unloaded from planes flying over populated areas. The potential for human and mechanical error was ever-present, and this risk only increased as the nuclear stockpile grew.
The Sputnik Effect
The Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 further accelerated the arms race. Fearing they were falling behind, the United States ramped up its weapons production, leading to an even larger and more dangerous stockpile.
Safety Concerns
As the number of nuclear weapons grew, so did concerns about their safety. Scientists like Robert Peurifoy and Carl Carlson from Sandia Laboratory advocated for more safety features to be built into the bombs.
One major concern was "one-point safety" – the vulnerability of bombs to accidental detonation if just one of the explosive detonators were to go off. While this wouldn't result in a full-scale nuclear explosion, it could release deadly radioactive material into the environment.
Despite these concerns, many in the government and military opposed additional safety features. They argued that such measures might increase the likelihood of the bombs failing to detonate when needed, and that retrofitting old bombs would be too costly.
A History of Close Calls
The Moroccan Incident
In January 1958, a plane loaded with a Mark 36 hydrogen bomb caught fire at an American airfield in Morocco. The base had to be evacuated as firefighters struggled to contain the blaze. Fortunately, the melted 8,000-pound bomb was recovered two hours later, and the radioactive material was safely buried.
The South Carolina Drop
Just a month after the Moroccan incident, a Mark 6 atomic bomb was accidentally dropped from a plane flying over South Carolina. While the fissile core wasn't inside the bomb, its conventional explosives detonated upon impact, leaving a 50-foot crater in a family's yard and destroying their house and car. Miraculously, the family suffered only minor injuries.
Alarming Statistics
A safety report issued later that year revealed that an average of seven bombs were being accidentally dropped every year. Additionally, there were twelve crashes or accidents involving planes carrying nuclear bombs annually.
The Human Factor
Another significant concern was the psychological stability of the personnel handling these weapons. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, there wasn't a thorough screening process for military personnel tasked with handling nuclear weapons. This meant there was a real risk of someone who was intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, or experiencing a mental health crisis accidentally or intentionally detonating a nuclear device.
European stockpiles were particularly vulnerable. There were minimal security measures in place to prevent a pilot in Germany from taking off with a nuclear-armed plane or a soldier in Italy from accessing and launching a nuclear rocket.
The Troubled B-52 Bombers
The B-52 bomber, despite its iconic status, was a frequent source of nuclear-related incidents:
In 1961, a B-52 crashed into a barley field in northern California while carrying two Mark 39 hydrogen bombs. Luckily, the bombs shattered without detonating.
Weeks later, another B-52 carrying two Mark 53 H-bombs crashed into a mountain in the Appalachians after its tail broke apart due to turbulence.
In 1966, a mid-air collision occurred during a refueling operation over southern Spain. The resulting crash scattered four Mark-28 H-bombs, with one partially detonating and releasing plutonium onto a nearby farm.
The Drug Culture Infiltrates the Military
The 1970s brought a new threat as military personnel, including those handling nuclear weapons, became involved in the growing drug culture. At one Air Force base in North Carolina, two-thirds of the security personnel were arrested on marijuana charges. Similar incidents occurred at other bases, with hundreds of officers arrested for using or dealing drugs on site.
During this period, it wasn't uncommon for hashish, heroin, and LSD to be discovered in the barracks and workstations of military personnel responsible for nuclear weapons.
The Quest for Better Command and Control
NORAD and SIOP
Efforts to develop reliable systems for commanding and controlling nuclear weapons led to some impressive technological advancements. NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) became the first computer network, linking radar systems across U.S. Air Force bases to detect a potential Soviet first strike.
Another crucial development was the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), a computer-generated plan for optimal nuclear destruction. Created in the late 1950s using an early IBM computer, SIOP's goal was to ensure the complete annihilation of the enemy with a 75-percent probability.
The 1960 version of SIOP called for 3,423 nuclear weapons to be directed at 1,000 different targets, potentially killing an estimated 220 million people immediately, with many more dying from fallout and aftereffects.
Close Calls with SIOP
SIOP came dangerously close to being activated on several occasions:
During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Strategic Air Command was ordered to DEFCON 2, just one level below imminent nuclear war. Sixty-five bombers were in the air, and multiple nuclear submarines were in striking position.
On multiple occasions, NORAD mistakenly identified incoming Soviet missiles due to computer glitches or human error. Fortunately, cool heads prevailed in these instances, preventing an accidental nuclear war.
The Damascus Incident: A Case Study in Nuclear Near-Misses
One of the most significant nuclear accidents in U.S. history occurred on September 18, 1980, at an underground missile silo in Damascus, Arkansas. This incident highlights the dangers inherent in maintaining a large nuclear arsenal and the potential for human error to lead to catastrophe.
The Titan II Missile
The Damascus silo housed a Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile, carrying a W-53 warhead – the most powerful in the U.S. arsenal at the time. The Titan II was notoriously dangerous, not just because of its nuclear payload, but also due to its highly toxic liquid propellants and explosive oxidizer.
The Accident Unfolds
During a routine maintenance procedure, a technician accidentally dropped a heavy socket, which fell 70 feet before striking the side of the rocket. This impact caused a leak of toxic vapor to fill the silo. Despite having checklists for numerous scenarios, the staff was unprepared for this particular situation, leading to confusion and panic.
The silo was evacuated, including the control room, which was protected by massive blast doors. As hours passed, a toxic cloud of rocket fuel vapor rose into the sky, attracting curious onlookers and news reporters.
Bureaucratic Delays
Jeff Kennedy, a highly respected Air Force missile mechanic, arrived on the scene and quickly assessed what needed to be done. However, the military's rigid chain of command and bureaucratic processes prevented immediate action. It took nearly eight hours for a plan to be approved, during which time the situation continued to deteriorate.
Fatal Decisions
When action was finally taken, a series of poor decisions compounded the danger:
Technicians were ordered to enter the silo through the main access door instead of the quicker and safer escape hatch.
Kennedy and his colleague, David Livingston, entered the silo only to find the air so toxic it began melting their protective suits.
After Kennedy and Livingston were ordered out, a final, fatal decision was made to turn on the ventilation fan to clear the vapor.
The Explosion
Moments after the ventilation fan was activated, the silo exploded into a tower of fire. David Livingston was killed, and the nuclear warhead was blasted into the air, landing in a ditch near the access road.
Remarkably, the official report blamed low-ranking officers and concluded that the Titan II was still "basically safe," indicating that little would change in terms of nuclear safety protocols.
1983: The Most Dangerous Year
The early 1980s saw a dramatic escalation in Cold War tensions, culminating in 1983 – arguably the most dangerous year in nuclear history.
The Reagan Administration's Nuclear Build-up
After Ronald Reagan's election in 1980, his administration committed $1.5 trillion to a defense budget that included expanding the nuclear arsenal. One of the new weapons was the Pershing II missile, with a range of just 1,000 miles – clearly intended for a potential strike on Moscow.
Escalating Tensions
Several events in 1983 brought the world perilously close to nuclear war:
The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. response of psychological warfare, including sending bombers into Soviet airspace.
The Soviet destruction of a Korean Airlines flight that accidentally entered their airspace, killing 269 passengers.
The U.S. invasion of Grenada to overthrow a Soviet-backed communist regime.
Able Archer 83
The most dangerous incident of the year was NATO's Able Archer 83 exercise, which simulated the procedures for authorizing nuclear warfare. The timing of this drill, just weeks before the scheduled deployment of Pershing II missiles in West Germany, couldn't have been worse.
When Soviet intelligence intercepted communications from the exercise, they believed it might be cover for an actual nuclear first strike. This misunderstanding brought the world closer to nuclear war than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The Turning Point
The Day After
On November 20, 1983, millions of Americans, including President Reagan, watched a made-for-TV film called "The Day After." This realistic portrayal of the aftermath of a nuclear war had a profound impact on public perception and policy.
Reagan was deeply affected by the film. In a public appearance shortly after, he dramatically shifted his rhetoric, declaring that "nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought."
A New Era of Cooperation
Reagan's change in attitude coincided with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as the new Soviet leader. Together, they began working to reduce their nuclear programs and bring an end to the Cold War.
Improvements in Nuclear Safety
After decades of warnings from scientists like Robert Peurifoy, the military finally agreed to invest in retrofitting some of its stockpile with improved safety devices. A House Foreign Affairs Committee report graded the safety of every type of weapon in the U.S. arsenal, revealing that only three received an A grade, while 12 received a D.
More recent safety improvements include:
- A barcode system to prevent the accidental transport of armed weapons on training missions.
- Enhanced security measures to protect against theft or unauthorized access.
Ongoing Challenges
While progress has been made in nuclear safety and arms reduction, significant challenges remain:
- The United States and Russia still possess large nuclear arsenals (around 3,740 weapons for Russia).
- Other nuclear powers, including France, China, and the United Kingdom, maintain smaller but still significant arsenals.
- The growing nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan, coupled with regional instability, pose a significant risk.
- The threat of nuclear terrorism remains a concern, particularly in regions with less secure nuclear facilities.
Final Thoughts
Eric Schlosser's "Command and Control" serves as a stark reminder of the immense dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Throughout the history of nuclear armament, we've come perilously close to catastrophe on numerous occasions, often due to simple human error or mechanical malfunction.
The book highlights several key takeaways:
The inherent danger of nuclear weapons: Even with the most stringent safety protocols, the potential for accidents or unintended use remains high.
The limitations of human control: No matter how well-trained or well-intentioned, humans are fallible, and mistakes in handling nuclear weapons can have catastrophic consequences.
The role of luck in avoiding disaster: On multiple occasions, it was often mere chance or the quick thinking of individuals that prevented nuclear incidents from escalating.
The ongoing need for transparency and safety improvements: Secrecy around nuclear weapons programs can hinder efforts to improve safety and design, potentially making us all more vulnerable.
The complex interplay between deterrence and danger: While nuclear weapons have played a role in preventing large-scale conflicts between major powers, their very existence poses an existential threat to humanity.
As we move forward in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape, the lessons from "Command and Control" remain critically relevant. The book serves as a call to action for continued efforts in nuclear disarmament, improved safety protocols, and increased international cooperation to reduce the risks associated with these weapons of mass destruction.
Ultimately, Schlosser's work reminds us that as long as nuclear weapons exist, so too does the possibility of their use – whether by intent, accident, or miscalculation. It is a sobering reality that demands our ongoing attention and effort to mitigate these risks for the sake of global security and the future of our planet.