Introduction
"This Blessed Plot" by Hugo Young is a comprehensive exploration of Britain's complex and often tumultuous relationship with Europe in the post-World War II era. The book traces the evolution of this relationship from Winston Churchill's vision of a united Europe to Tony Blair's cautious embrace of European integration. Young's work provides valuable insights into the historical, political, and cultural factors that have shaped Britain's stance towards Europe, offering a deeper understanding of the events that ultimately led to Brexit in 2016.
Britain's Post-War Relationship with Europe: A Shaky Start
In the aftermath of World War II, Britain found itself in a unique position. As the only European power that had successfully defended its territory against Nazi invasion, Britain played a crucial role in liberating the continent from fascist rule. This experience, however, also set the stage for a complicated relationship with the rest of Europe.
Winston Churchill, recognizing the devastating consequences of European division, envisioned a united Europe as a means to prevent future catastrophes. He had been advocating for a "United States of Europe" since 1930, and in 1946, he delivered a significant speech in Zürich outlining his ideas for European unification.
Churchill's plan called for the creation of a Council of Europe, which would serve as a forum to deepen ties between European nations without interfering with national sovereignty. While French and German leaders were receptive to this idea, Churchill's own country was not in a position to implement his vision.
The Labour Party, which had come to power in 1945, opposed Churchill's concept of "European supranationalism." Instead, they favored a more international approach to European policy-making, focusing on initiatives like NATO and the American-led Marshall Plan.
As a result, Britain continued to resist plans for further European integration. Meanwhile, France and West Germany moved forward without British involvement, forming the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950. The ECSC, which also included Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, established a common market and represented the first iteration of what would later become the European Union.
This divergence in approach set the stage for decades of tension between Britain and its European neighbors, as the country struggled to find its place in the evolving European landscape.
Britain's Shifting Priorities and the Suez Crisis
When Churchill and the Conservative Party returned to power in 1951, the message of European unity had been overshadowed by other priorities. Britain's partnership with the United States had become a central focus of British foreign policy, creating conflicting interests with regards to European integration.
Having contributed troops to the Korean War, Britain was keen to ensure American support in controlling Soviet activities in Eastern Europe. This partnership, however, came with strings attached. The United States wanted Britain to lead the call for European unity, a prospect that made British leaders uneasy.
British policymakers feared that a unified Europe would diminish their unique influence in Washington and potentially lead to the withdrawal of US troops from the continent. These concerns kept Britain on the sidelines of European integration efforts.
However, a geopolitical crisis was about to force Britain to reconsider its stance. In 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, a move that deeply alarmed Britain and France, both of which had long-standing interests in the region. As Britain contemplated its response to this crisis, it became painfully clear that the United States was unwilling to provide military and economic assistance.
The Suez Crisis marked a turning point in British foreign policy. Without American support, the operation against Egypt proved too costly, and Britain was forced to abandon its efforts. This humiliating retreat left Britain looking like a weakened power on the world stage and signaled the beginning of the end of the British colonial empire.
The Suez Crisis served as a wake-up call for British leaders, forcing them to reassess their position in the world and reconsider the benefits of joining the growing European family. It became increasingly clear that Britain could no longer rely solely on its special relationship with the United States or its dwindling empire to maintain its global influence.
Britain's Cautious Approach to the European Economic Community
In the wake of the Suez Crisis, Harold Macmillan became the new Conservative Prime Minister in January 1957. Like Churchill, Macmillan had a history of pro-European sentiment and clearly recognized the benefits of a unified continent.
Just two months after Macmillan's appointment, the leaders of the ECSC signed the Treaty of Rome, giving birth to the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC was designed to create a common market without trade barriers and further reduce customs duties between member nations.
Macmillan understood that Europe would continue to unify with or without Britain, and that if Britain continued to resist joining, its position would only deteriorate further. Germany's rapid economic growth and increasing exports served as a stark reminder of Britain's declining economic power.
In 1962, Macmillan finally submitted Britain's application for entry into the EEC. However, there were still significant obstacles to overcome before Britain could join the European community.
One major roadblock was Britain's relationship with its Commonwealth. Ideally, Britain wanted to maintain its preferential trading deals with Commonwealth nations while also joining the EEC. This desire to "have its cake and eat it too" proved problematic in negotiations.
The reality, however, was that Britain's colonial empire was crumbling, and the economic advantages it provided were diminishing compared to the growing European economy. Commonwealth nations were increasingly looking elsewhere for trade partnerships, with Australia turning to Asia and Canada to the United States.
Despite these challenges, Macmillan pressed forward with Britain's bid to join the EEC. However, the path to membership would prove to be far from smooth, as both domestic and international forces conspired to keep Britain out of the European community.
De Gaulle's Veto and Britain's Continued Struggle
On January 14, 1963, French President Charles de Gaulle delivered a shocking blow to Britain's European aspirations by vetoing their bid to join the EEC. This decision infuriated the other EEC members, with the exception of Luxembourg, and left many wondering about de Gaulle's motivations.
It's likely that de Gaulle felt threatened by Britain, fearing that it might supplant France as the political leader of the EEC. Although he had previously expressed support for Britain's membership, de Gaulle now raised concerns about the role of the British Commonwealth in Europe, questioning how India and Britain's African territories could possibly fit into the European framework.
This veto put Britain's entry into the EEC on hold, and Macmillan didn't get a second chance to pursue membership. In 1964, his Conservative Party was replaced by the Labour Party, led by Prime Minister Harold Wilson.
At this point, the Labour Party was staunchly opposed to joining the EEC. The party's former leader, Hugh Gaitskell, had given a blistering speech in 1962 declaring that joining the EEC would mean the end of Britain as they knew it. It was with this platform of Euroscepticism, pro-Commonwealth sentiment, and emphasis on national sovereignty that the Labour Party capitalized on Macmillan's political failings and won the election.
This anti-EEC message worked again in the 1966 election, allowing Wilson to stay in power. However, by this time, it was becoming increasingly clear that Britain's position was unsustainable. The Commonwealth was crumbling, with Rhodesia declaring independence and other nations growing increasingly frustrated with Wilson's decisions, particularly his choice to begin withdrawing British troops from Southeast Asian territories.
Meanwhile, Britain continued to face one domestic economic crisis after another. These mounting pressures would eventually force Wilson to reconsider Britain's stance towards Europe, setting the stage for another attempt at EEC membership.
Britain's Economic Struggles and Renewed Interest in the EEC
As Britain's economic woes continued throughout the 1960s, Prime Minister Harold Wilson began to realize that the best way to restore prosperity was to shift focus away from the Commonwealth and toward Europe. This realization led to a cautious campaign for British entry into the EEC.
In early 1967, Wilson delivered a speech in Strasbourg that hinted at the full reversal he'd made in his European policy. The speech alluded to Britain and Europe's shared history, even referencing the original Anglo-Saxons who came from the continent to settle in Britain. This marked a significant shift in rhetoric from the Labour Party's previous anti-EEC stance.
On May 2, 1967, Wilson announced that Britain intended to submit its second application for EEC membership. Remarkably, the response was universally positive. The mood had changed drastically in the four years since France's veto, with many wondering how Britain's entry might alter the EEC for the better.
Even Charles de Gaulle seemed more receptive this time around. This change in attitude was likely influenced by the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia, which highlighted the need for a united Western Europe to deal with Soviet aggression.
When de Gaulle stepped down from the presidency in 1969, the door was wide open for Britain's entry. However, 1970 was another election year, and Wilson planned to submit the application after the vote, confident that his Labour Party would win.
Contrary to Wilson's predictions, the Conservative Party took control that year, and the fate of Britain's European future lay in the hands of Prime Minister Edward Heath. Fortunately, Heath's policy on the EEC didn't differ much from Wilson's cautious pro-Europeanism, and the application and negotiations proceeded on schedule.
However, the negotiations revealed how much Britain's position had changed. No longer the great world power it had been just a decade before, Britain was in no position to make demands. This time around, Britain was willing to agree to the established EEC rules, though some exceptions were made, such as allowing temporary special trade arrangements with the Commonwealth for a five-year transitional period.
This shift in Britain's negotiating position reflected the country's diminished global status and the growing realization that its future prosperity was increasingly tied to Europe.
Britain's Entry into the EEC and the 1975 Referendum
Britain officially joined the European Economic Community on January 1, 1973, marking a significant milestone in its post-war history. However, the country's relationship with the EEC remained contentious, particularly within British politics.
Just a year after joining, the Labour Party returned to power, having campaigned on a promise to renegotiate the terms of Britain's entry. Many of the party's left-leaning members were strongly against the EEC altogether, viewing it as a threat to British workers and national sovereignty.
While the renegotiations were partially successful, a majority of the Labour Party still wanted to leave the Common Market. This internal division led to a decision to hold a referendum, asking the British people whether they wanted to stay in the EEC under the newly negotiated terms.
The referendum was set for 1975, a particularly turbulent year for Britain. The country was in the midst of a global recession that had been hitting hard for the past two years, driving inflation rates up by 25 percent. Additionally, Irish militant attacks were weighing heavily on the public consciousness, and there were growing fears that Britain might break up altogether due to the increasing popularity of the pro-independence Scottish National Party.
In this climate of uncertainty, many voters saw the EEC as a stable body that could potentially help Britain recover economically and maintain its unity. Pre-vote polling consistently showed that two-thirds of the public were in favor of remaining in the EEC, including business leaders and much of the nation's media.
Meanwhile, the anti-EEC campaign argued that staying in the Common Market would cause further economic hardships and put British sovereignty at risk. However, these arguments failed to sway the mainstream consensus.
On June 5, 1975, 67 percent of the British electorate voted to remain in the EEC. This result seemed to settle the question of Britain's place in Europe, at least for the time being. However, the underlying tensions and divisions that had led to the referendum would continue to simmer beneath the surface of British politics for decades to come.
Margaret Thatcher's Impact on Britain's Relationship with Europe
The election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979 marked a new chapter in Britain's relationship with the European Economic Community. Thatcher, known for her direct and often abrasive negotiating style, was eager to lower Britain's net contribution to the EEC.
Her first major European negotiation took place during backroom meetings at the 1979 European Council summit in Dublin. There, Thatcher managed to secure a temporary deal that lowered Britain's contribution for two years. When this deal expired, negotiations resumed at the 1984 EEC summit in Fontainebleau, France. Once again, Thatcher's forceful approach proved effective, and she secured a permanent rebate for Britain.
However, Thatcher's engagement with Europe went beyond financial negotiations. She developed a good working relationship with French President François Mitterrand, and together they aimed to launch a new and improved EEC. Their goal was to move the Common Market toward a truly "single" market, or as Thatcher preferred, an unregulated "free" market.
This push for free trade had unintended consequences that would eventually contribute to Thatcher's downfall. In 1986, the Single European Act was passed, aimed at completing the transition to a single market within six years. However, this led to proposals that Thatcher strongly opposed, such as a monetary union and a European central bank.
When the President of the EEC announced plans to give the supranational body even more autonomous power, Thatcher realized that the situation was spiraling beyond her control. Her initial enthusiasm for European economic integration had inadvertently opened the door to political integration that she found unacceptable.
Thatcher's growing opposition to further European integration put her at odds with many in her own party and contributed to the internal conflicts that would eventually lead to her resignation in 1990. Her legacy on European policy was complex: while she had pushed for greater economic integration, she also sowed the seeds of Euroscepticism that would continue to influence British politics for years to come.
The Maastricht Treaty and Growing Divisions in British Politics
The 1990s brought new challenges to Britain's relationship with Europe, starting with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. This treaty represented a significant step towards European integration, transforming the European Economic Community into the European Union.
While the Conservatives had won the 1992 election on a pro-EEC platform, the Maastricht Treaty proved to be a deeply divisive issue within the party. Even though Britain had managed to secure an opt-out from the planned monetary union, many conservatives feared that the country's economic autonomy would be transferred from Westminster to unelected bureaucrats in Brussels.
These fears persisted even after the treaty was ratified in 1993. A large group of Eurosceptics formed in Parliament, putting pressure on the Conservative Party leadership. The party began to tear itself apart over the European issue, unable to reconcile its internal differences.
This disunity within the Conservative Party created an opportunity for the Labour Party, led by Tony Blair, to present itself as a united, pro-European alternative. In the 1997 election, the Labour Party emerged victorious, with Blair becoming Britain's first entirely pro-European Prime Minister.
Blair's pro-European stance was partly a reaction to the perceived anti-Europeanism of the Thatcher years. The atmosphere of anti-Thatcherism in the 1990s had set the stage for Labour's winning platform. Blair even declared support for the monetary union, although he stopped short of committing Britain to adopt the Euro.
During a 1998 meeting with the eleven other EU heads of state, every member except Blair signed a pledge to begin using the Euro within the next five years. This decision was a political calculation on Blair's part, who feared that signing the pledge might trigger a negative reaction from the right-wing press and cost him the next election.
Blair's cautious approach to Europe reflected the enduring ambivalence in British attitudes towards European integration. Even though he had been elected on a pro-Europe platform, Blair recognized that it would take more than an election to change Britain's deep-seated feelings of separateness from the rest of Europe.
The Ongoing Struggle: Britain's Uneasy Place in Europe
As the 20th century drew to a close, Britain's relationship with Europe remained as complex and contentious as ever. Despite decades of membership in the European Economic Community and then the European Union, the country continued to grapple with its role and identity within the broader European project.
The Labour government under Tony Blair, while ostensibly pro-European, maintained a cautious approach to further integration. This caution was particularly evident in Britain's decision to remain outside the Eurozone, preserving the pound as its national currency. This choice reflected the ongoing concerns about sovereignty and economic autonomy that had characterized British attitudes towards Europe for decades.
Meanwhile, Euroscepticism continued to simmer within British politics, particularly within the Conservative Party. The issue of Europe remained a divisive force, with some politicians and segments of the public viewing EU membership as a threat to British independence and traditions.
The media also played a significant role in shaping public opinion on Europe. Many British newspapers maintained a skeptical or outright hostile stance towards the EU, often focusing on perceived threats to British sovereignty or the financial costs of membership.
As the EU continued to evolve and expand, with new members joining from Eastern Europe, Britain found itself grappling with additional challenges. Issues such as immigration and the free movement of people within the EU became increasingly contentious topics in British political discourse.
Despite these ongoing tensions, Britain remained an influential player within the EU. Its size, economic power, and historical global connections meant that it often played a crucial role in shaping EU policies and decisions. However, this influence was frequently exercised in a way that set Britain apart from its European partners, reinforcing its image as a reluctant and sometimes obstructive member of the union.
The unresolved nature of Britain's relationship with Europe set the stage for continued debate and conflict in the years to come. The tensions between the desire for the economic benefits of EU membership and the fear of lost sovereignty would ultimately culminate in the Brexit referendum of 2016, a event that would once again reshape Britain's place in Europe and the world.
Conclusion: The Enduring Complexity of Britain's European Relationship
"This Blessed Plot" by Hugo Young provides a comprehensive and nuanced exploration of Britain's post-war relationship with Europe. From Churchill's initial vision of a united Europe to Blair's cautious embrace of European integration, the book traces the evolution of British attitudes and policies towards the European project.
Throughout this period, Britain's approach to Europe was characterized by ambivalence and contradiction. On one hand, there was a recognition of the economic benefits of European integration and the need to be part of a larger bloc in an increasingly globalized world. On the other hand, there was a persistent fear of lost sovereignty and a desire to maintain Britain's unique global position, shaped by its imperial past and special relationship with the United States.
This tension manifested itself in various ways over the decades. Britain was often late to join European initiatives, such as the European Economic Community, and when it did join, it frequently sought special arrangements or opt-outs. The country's leaders, from both major parties, had to navigate between the demands of pro-European business interests and a often Eurosceptic public and media.
Young's work highlights how personal relationships and individual leadership styles played a crucial role in shaping Britain's European policy. From Macmillan's cautious approach to Thatcher's combative style and Blair's attempt at bridge-building, each leader left their mark on Britain's European journey.
The book also underscores the importance of external events in shaping Britain's European policy. The Suez Crisis, for instance, forced a reassessment of Britain's global position and pushed it towards Europe. The Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union also had significant impacts on European integration and Britain's role within it.
Ultimately, "This Blessed Plot" reveals that Britain's relationship with Europe has never been straightforward or settled. The country has struggled to reconcile its European identity with its global ambitions, its desire for economic integration with its fear of political union.
This ongoing tension, so vividly described by Young, provides essential context for understanding the events that would unfold in the years following the book's publication, including the growing Euroscepticism of the early 21st century and the eventual decision to leave the European Union in the Brexit referendum of 2016.
Young's work serves as a reminder that the Brexit vote, far from being an anomaly, was the culmination of decades of complex and often contradictory attitudes towards Europe. It underscores the deep-rooted nature of Britain's European dilemma and suggests that, even as Britain charts a new course outside the EU, its relationship with Europe will likely remain a central and contentious issue in its politics and national identity for years to come.