Book cover of To Stop a Warlord by Shannon Sedgwick Davis

To Stop a Warlord

by Shannon Sedgwick Davis

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"To Stop a Warlord" by Shannon Sedgwick Davis is a gripping true story of one woman's quest to end the reign of terror of Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in East-Central Africa. As the head of the Bridgeway Foundation, a human rights organization, Davis embarked on an unconventional and daring mission to stop one of the world's most notorious warlords.

The book provides a compelling account of how Davis and her team went beyond traditional philanthropy and humanitarian aid to take direct action against the LRA. It's a story of determination, innovation, and the power of individuals to make a difference in seemingly impossible situations.

The Rise of Joseph Kony and the LRA

Historical Context

To understand the conflict, we need to go back to the colonial era. When British colonizers arrived in the 1890s, they established Uganda and favored the southern Baganda ethnic group. This marginalized the northern Acholi people, setting the stage for future conflicts.

After Uganda gained independence in 1962, tensions between the north and south persisted. In 1986, Yoweri Museveni overthrew an Acholi-led government, sparking a civil war. It was in this context that Joseph Kony, an Acholi born in 1961, came of age.

The Birth of the LRA

Kony initially rose through the ranks of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), a religious group aiming to "purify" the Acholi people. When the HSM was defeated in 1987, Kony formed the Lord's Resistance Army, ostensibly to protect the Acholi against government reprisals.

However, as support for the LRA waned in the mid-1990s, Kony turned to brutal tactics to maintain his army. He began abducting civilians, including children, to fill his ranks. This marked the beginning of a reign of terror that would last for decades.

The LRA's Reign of Terror

Over the next 25 years, the LRA's atrocities were staggering:

  • Approximately 300,000 children were forcibly recruited as soldiers and sex slaves
  • Hundreds of thousands of people were killed
  • Two million civilians were displaced

The conflict spilled over from northern Uganda into neighboring countries, including Sudan, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The LRA became known for its extreme brutality, often forcing abducted children to kill their own family members or commit other atrocities.

The International Community's Failed Response

Ineffective Peace Talks

By 2006, the Ugandan army had pushed the LRA out of Uganda, and the government initiated peace talks with Kony. The international community was hopeful that a resolution was in sight. However, these talks dragged on for two years without reaching a conclusion.

During this time, Kony used the lull in fighting to regroup and prepare for future conflicts. He never abandoned his goal of overthrowing the Ugandan government.

Operation Lightning Thunder

In 2008, when peace talks broke down, the LRA resumed its activities across Sudan, Congo, and the Central African Republic. In response, Uganda launched Operation Lightning Thunder in December 2008, a joint military operation with other affected countries aimed at capturing Kony and decapitating the LRA leadership.

The operation was a disaster. Kony was tipped off and escaped before the attack. Worse, the failed operation caused the LRA to splinter into smaller, more mobile units spread across a vast area, making them even harder to track and combat.

The Christmas Massacres

The LRA's response to Operation Lightning Thunder was swift and brutal. On Christmas Eve and Christmas Day of 2008, LRA rebels went on a killing spree in northeastern Congo and southern Sudan. They massacred 620 civilians and abducted 160 children.

The United Nations, despite having 16,000 peacekeepers in the region, was unable to prevent or respond effectively to these attacks. Only 200 peacekeepers had been assigned to areas with LRA activity, leaving civilians largely unprotected.

The Failure of International Efforts

The inability of the international community to stop the LRA was due to several factors:

  1. The LRA operated in extremely remote areas with poor infrastructure and communication.
  2. Kony's forces were highly mobile and knew the terrain intimately.
  3. UN peacekeepers were reluctant to engage the LRA directly, especially after losing eight Guatemalan peacekeepers in 2006.
  4. The International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Kony for crimes against humanity in 2005 but lacked the power to arrest him.
  5. Local armies, like the Congolese forces, were underfunded and ill-equipped to combat the LRA effectively.

Shannon Sedgwick Davis and the Bridgeway Foundation

Davis's Call to Action

It was the news of the Christmas Massacres that spurred Shannon Sedgwick Davis to action. As the head of the Bridgeway Foundation, an organization committed to ending mass atrocities, Davis felt compelled to do something about this long-running conflict that seemed beyond the ability of traditional international actors to resolve.

The Early Warning Network

Davis and the Bridgeway Foundation's first step was to support the development of an "Early Warning Network" in the affected areas. This initiative aimed to:

  1. Help local communities share information about LRA movements
  2. Allow villages to evade or prevent attacks
  3. Document LRA atrocities to raise international awareness

Working with Father Abbé Benoît Kinalegu, a Catholic priest in Congo, Bridgeway funded the purchase and installation of high-frequency (HF) radios in remote villages. These solar-powered, easily concealable radios could receive signals over 500 miles, allowing rapid communication between communities.

Moving Beyond Traditional Philanthropy

While the Early Warning Network was effective in gathering data and saving some lives, Davis and her team realized it wasn't enough to stop the LRA's attacks. They began to consider more direct action, including supporting a military campaign against the LRA.

This was a significant departure from traditional philanthropy and humanitarian work. It required careful legal consideration and a willingness to take risks in pursuit of their goal to stop Kony and the LRA.

The Military Initiative

Partnering with the Ugandan Military

Davis and her colleague Laren Poole approached the Ugandan military with a proposal. They met with General Aronda, a high-ranking Ugandan officer, and offered to provide equipment and specialized training for a new unit dedicated to capturing Kony.

After negotiations, they reached an agreement:

  1. Bridgeway would cover the costs of necessary equipment (cell phones, satellite phones, GPS devices, surveillance aircraft, and helicopters).
  2. The Ugandan military would create a special unit for the mission.
  3. This unit would receive training from a partner of Bridgeway's choosing.

Recruiting Eeben Barlow

To lead the training program, Davis and Poole recruited Eeben Barlow, a South African mercenary with extensive experience in African conflicts. Despite initial reservations about Barlow's background, Davis was impressed by his commitment to the mission and his understanding of the terrain and tactics needed to combat the LRA.

Operation Viper

On February 3, 2011, Operation Viper was launched. This offensive against the LRA had Kony's capture as its top priority. The newly formed Special Operations Group (SOG) began its rigorous training under Barlow's guidance.

The training was intense:

  • Out of 1,200 applicants, 280 soldiers were initially selected.
  • The first day involved three seven-mile runs with 100-pound backpacks.
  • Only 136 soldiers graduated from the program in mid-June 2011.

Innovative Tactics

Defection Messaging

As the SOG began to put pressure on the LRA, Davis and her team realized the potential for encouraging LRA fighters to defect. They developed an innovative approach to defection messaging, learning from successful campaigns in other conflicts, such as Colombia's efforts against leftist guerrillas.

Their approach improved upon previous UN efforts by:

  1. Using culturally appropriate messaging
  2. Providing up-to-date information
  3. Broadcasting messages from ex-LRA soldiers promising amnesty

The team used helicopter-mounted speakers to broadcast these messages over vast areas of bush, reaching LRA fighters who were otherwise isolated from outside information.

Early Successes

The defection messaging strategy showed immediate results:

  • On the first day, a 15-year-old girl surrendered.
  • Two LRA sergeants soon followed.
  • Over time, a steady stream of defectors emerged from the bush.

These defections not only weakened the LRA but also provided valuable intelligence for future operations.

The Hunt for Kony

A Major Break

In December 2012, one of Kony's most trusted aides, a man named Okello, surrendered to the SOG. His debriefing led to a raid on the hideout of Lieutenant Colonel Binany, the mastermind behind the 2009 Christmas Massacres. While Binany was killed in the raid, his backpack contained crucial information: a GPS device with coordinates of a remote settlement in Darfur, Sudan.

Operation Merlin

Using this intelligence, the SOG and their US allies identified what they believed to be Kony's personal compound. Drone surveillance and intercepted communications seemed to confirm Kony's presence. The stage was set for Operation Merlin, a raid designed to capture Kony once and for all.

Davis worked tirelessly to secure funding for two Mi-17 transport helicopters to move SOG forces into position. On March 3, 2013, the operation was launched from Uganda, with the SOG unit set to make contact on March 5.

A Bitter Disappointment

However, on the night before the planned raid, US General Korbel informed Davis that aerial reconnaissance showed the camp was empty. Somehow, Kony had received warning and evacuated, just as he had done in 2008.

When the SOG finally reached "Camp Merlin," they found it abandoned. They burned the camp, leaving nothing but ashes where Kony had so recently lived.

The Aftermath and Reassessment

Changing Tactics

The failure to capture Kony was a significant blow to the morale of the SOG and the entire operation. However, it also led to a reassessment of their strategy. As Ugandan Colonel Kabango pointed out, they had been so focused on "cutting the head off the snake" (capturing Kony) that they had overlooked how effective they had been at "cutting the snake off the head" (weakening the LRA as a whole).

Measurable Impact

Despite not capturing Kony, the operation had achieved significant results:

  • In the year before the SOG was deployed, the LRA had killed nearly 800 people.
  • By 2012, that number had dropped to just 13.
  • The defection campaign had steadily decimated the LRA's ranks.
  • Kony was now isolated and had little control over most of his former forces.

Bridgeway's Exit

Recognizing these successes, Davis and Poole decided it was time to end Bridgeway's direct involvement in the region. They concluded that while capturing Kony might satisfy a desire for justice, their resources could be better used elsewhere. The structures they had helped put in place were working, and the balance had shifted towards peace.

In June 2015, Bridgeway officially closed down its East-Central African operations.

Lessons and Reflections

The Power of Direct Action

"To Stop a Warlord" demonstrates the potential impact of direct action when traditional diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts fail. Davis and her team showed that a small, dedicated group with innovative ideas could make a significant difference in a long-standing conflict.

The Importance of Local Partnerships

The success of the operation relied heavily on partnerships with local actors, from community leaders involved in the Early Warning Network to the Ugandan military. These partnerships were crucial in navigating the complex local dynamics and ensuring the sustainability of their efforts.

The Value of Unconventional Approaches

By thinking outside the box and being willing to take risks, Davis and her team developed tactics that proved highly effective against the LRA. Their defection messaging campaign, in particular, showed how creative solutions could achieve results where traditional military operations had failed.

The Complexity of Justice

While the book highlights the importance of bringing war criminals to justice, it also raises questions about the most effective ways to achieve this goal. Sometimes, as in the case of the LRA, weakening an organization and encouraging defections can do more to end violence than the capture of a single leader.

The Human Cost of Conflict

Throughout the book, Davis never loses sight of the human cost of the LRA's reign of terror. The stories of abducted children, devastated communities, and lives lost serve as a constant reminder of why this work was so crucial.

Conclusion

"To Stop a Warlord" is a powerful testament to the impact that dedicated individuals can have in the face of seemingly insurmountable challenges. Shannon Sedgwick Davis and her team at the Bridgeway Foundation demonstrated that innovative thinking, direct action, and a willingness to take risks can achieve results where traditional approaches have failed.

While Joseph Kony remains at large, the LRA has been severely weakened, and civilian casualties in the region have dropped dramatically. The Early Warning Network, defection messaging campaigns, and other initiatives put in place by Davis and her team continue to protect communities and encourage LRA fighters to lay down their arms.

The book serves as both an inspiring story of human determination and a thought-provoking exploration of the complexities of international justice and conflict resolution. It challenges readers to consider what they might do when faced with injustice and reminds us that even in the darkest situations, there is always hope for positive change.

As Davis reflects at the end of the book, looking at a photo of a child soldier being led to safety by an SOG member, the impact of their work goes far beyond the failure to capture one man. It's about the lives saved, the children rescued, and the communities given a chance to live in peace.

"To Stop a Warlord" is ultimately a call to action, encouraging readers to look beyond traditional solutions and to have the courage to take direct action in the face of injustice. It's a reminder that while the problems of the world may seem overwhelming, dedicated individuals can make a real and lasting difference.

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