To Stop a Warlord Summary

Can one civilian woman on the other side of the world stop a warlord responsible for countless atrocities? This is the remarkable true story of Shannon Sedgwick Davis and her battle to end the terror of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

1. Origins of the LRA: A Brutal Response to Historical Conflicts

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) emerged from decades of ethnic and regional tension in Uganda, exacerbated by colonialist policies favoring the southern Baganda over the northern Acholi people. The marginalized Acholi found themselves relegated to roles in labor and military service, fueling resentment.

In the 1980s, post-independence, the overthrow of an Acholi-led government by Yoweri Museveni’s regime intensified these divides. Amid this turmoil, Joseph Kony rose to lead the LRA, initially presenting it as a movement to protect Acholi people. However, the group descended into unthinkable violence, targeting civilians instead of fighting for political goals.

By terrorizing multiple countries—Uganda, Sudan, Congo, and beyond—the LRA became infamous for abducting children to serve as soldiers or sex slaves. Kony’s reign left a devastating legacy, with over 300,000 children kidnapped and millions displaced.

Examples

• British colonial policies entrenched the north-south divide in Uganda, leaving the Acholi marginalized.
• The overthrow of an Acholi-led government in the 1980s marked the start of heightened civil unrest.
• The LRA forcibly recruited children into its ranks, with some as young as six years old being forced to take up arms.

2. The Christmas Massacres: A Catalyst for Change

In 2008, Operation Lightning Thunder, intended to destroy the LRA, failed when Kony escaped, leading to devastating retaliation. During the 2009 Christmas Massacres in Congo, LRA rebels killed over 620 people and abducted 160 children.

Shannon Sedgwick Davis read the horrifying reports while holding her newborn son in Texas. Moved to act, she decided to use her resources as head of the Bridgeway Foundation to combat the LRA. The incident became her turning point from observer to active participant.

The Christmas Massacres exposed the helplessness of international peacekeeping forces and the failure of military interventions. This spurred Davis to explore innovative, grassroots-driven approaches to stopping the atrocities.

Examples

• UN peacekeepers stationed in Congo failed to prevent the massacre, reacting too late.
• Davis decided to focus her foundation's work on the LRA after reading a report on the massacre while caring for her baby.
• Operation Lightning Thunder caused the LRA to splinter into smaller, harder-to-track groups.

3. Challenges in Tracking Kony and the LRA

Kony’s success in avoiding capture stemmed from his unique strategies. Operating in remote areas with limited infrastructure, the LRA dispersed into small, mobile units skilled at navigating dense, untracked jungles.

Poor communication facilities in affected regions delayed news, making it hard for victims to get help or for the world to understand the severity of events. For example, news of the 2010 Makombo Massacre, in which 320 civilians were killed, surfaced three months after the attack.

Even with satellite technologies and international collaboration, Kony’s fugitiveness underscored how geography, limited resources, and mistrust of international systems protected him.

Examples

• The LRA’s attack in Makombo went unreported for months due to the inaccessibility of the Congo jungle.
• The group’s decentralized structure provided fewer targets for military operations.
• UN reluctance to confront the LRA stemmed from past ambushes, such as when eight Guatemalan peacekeepers were killed in 2006.

4. Early Warning Networks: A Game-Changing Strategy

Bridgeway’s first major initiative was to create “Early Warning Networks” in vulnerable villages. Using HF radios to transmit warnings about impending LRA attacks, the system enabled communities to protect themselves by escaping or preparing for the worst.

Local leaders played a foundational role, with figures like Father Abbé Benoît Kinalegu advocating for technology to thwart LRA raids. Invisible Children, an NGO, teamed up with Bridgeway to raise funds for radios that were easy to hide and solar-powered, ensuring protection in places without electricity.

The system saved countless lives and offered a new, grassroots-style solution for documenting LRA crimes to spur international action.

Examples

• Radios installed in Haut-Uele helped alert villagers to LRA movements.
• Collaboration between Bridgeway Foundation and Invisible Children raised $35,000 to purchase critical equipment.
• Father Kinalegu’s leadership ensured the system addressed practical, real-world challenges.

5. Launching A Military Campaign

Bridgeway took the unconventional step of funding a focused military operation specifically to capture Kony. After discussions with Ugandan General Aronda, Davis negotiated support for a special unit trained to track and defeat the LRA.

Instead of relying on slower, large-scale forces, the unit would focus on mobility, precision, and improved technology. Bridgeway’s role was to provide essential materials, from communication devices to helicopters.

Despite the risks involved, Davis believed the military route was unavoidable. The Ugandan army, stretched thin and under-equipped, needed external backing to weaken Kony's stronghold.

Examples

• The military unit bridged existing gaps in technology, training, and mobility.
• Shannon Sedgwick Davis negotiated directly with General Aronda, ensuring international support extended responsibly.
• Bridgeway purchased vital equipment, such as GPS systems and surveillance aircraft.

6. Collaborating with a Controversial Ally

To train the Ugandan soldiers, Davis partnered with Eeben Barlow, a former mercenary. Though his ethical history raised concerns, Barlow’s expertise in African bush warfare proved essential.

During rigorous training sessions, Barlow ensured only highly disciplined soldiers made the cut. By June 2011, a lean but effective Special Operations Group of 136 elite soldiers was ready to engage directly with the LRA.

Barlow’s tactical guidance, combined with Bridgeway’s logistical support, laid the groundwork for one of the region’s most effective military responses to Kony.

Examples

• Barlow contributed expertise from similar efforts in Sierra Leone.
• Soldiers underwent demanding physical preparation, including miles-long runs.
• Under Barlow’s instruction, Ugandan forces adapted to jungle warfare tactics.

7. Encouraging Defections Over Confrontation

Convincing LRA members to defect became a central strategy after the firing of defection messages from helicopters proved effective. Using recordings of ex-combatants, Bridgeway appealed to the humanity of LRA fighters and promised them safety upon surrender.

The messages resonated. Just hours into the campaign, a 15-year-old girl surrendered, followed by two LRA fighters. Soon, the steady stream of defectors began weakening Kony’s inner circle and reduced attacks.

This shift from seeking violent confrontation to targeted psychological operations saved countless lives while reducing the long-term threat.

Examples

• Loudspeakers broadcast Acholi-language assurances, addressing cultural sensitivities.
• Helicopter flyovers covered significant ground, expanding the radius of defection efforts.
• Ex-combatants personally vouched for the safety of defectors, making the promise credible.

8. Close Calls: Nearing Kony’s Capture

The defectors provided critical intelligence, including details about Kony’s movements and hideouts. In 2013, GPS data led the Special Operations Group to Camp Merlin in Sudan, where drones confirmed his presence.

However, a leak within the chain of command allowed Kony and his followers to escape just days before the final assault. When the SOG reached the camp, it was abandoned.

This failure underscored the persistent challenges of dealing with informants and coordinating between governments with differing objectives.

Examples

• A GPS device recovered in a raid provided Kony’s location.
• Drones confirmed real-time footage of Kony in his Sudanese hideout.
• Despite preparation, the intervention was foiled by leaks to Kony’s camp.

9. A Legacy of Reduced Violence

Despite failing to capture Kony, Bridgeway’s efforts severely weakened the LRA. Annual civilian casualties dropped from nearly 800 to 13 within a few years, marking a significant reduction in suffering across East-Central Africa.

The program’s mix of grassroots protections and defect-focused campaigns shifted the balance in favor of peace. Shannon Sedgwick Davis eventually closed the project in 2015, prioritizing resources for new challenges.

Though Kony remained at large, his defanged organization no longer posed the same catastrophic threat.

Examples

• Defection strategies dismantled Kony’s support network.
• Data showed sharp declines in casualties after the campaign’s interventions.
• The Ugandan military redirected its forces to other missions, reflecting reduced urgency.

Takeaways

1. Support grassroots communication networks in areas prone to violence—simple tools like radios can save lives.
2. Promote defection programs as a non-violent way to dismantle extremist groups by undermining trust within their ranks.
3. Focus on multi-faceted strategies, balancing direct military intervention with humanitarian approaches to provide both short and long-term solutions.