Introduction
Daniel Ellsberg's "The Doomsday Machine" is a chilling insider account of America's nuclear weapons program during the Cold War. As a former military analyst with top-secret clearance, Ellsberg provides unique insights into how close humanity has come to nuclear annihilation. This eye-opening book challenges common assumptions about nuclear warfare and reveals disturbing truths about the vulnerabilities in the command and control systems governing these apocalyptic weapons.
The Origins of Strategic Bombing
Ellsberg traces the roots of modern nuclear strategy back to the 1930s, when advances in aircraft technology enabled a new and terrifying form of warfare: strategic bombing of civilian populations.
Prior to this, European wars generally tried to avoid civilian casualties, following the "just war" doctrine that innocent non-combatants should not be deliberately targeted. But the ability of aircraft to fly over defensive lines and strike deep into enemy territory changed the calculus of war.
The first major use of strategic bombing came during the Spanish Civil War, immortalized in Picasso's famous painting "Guernica." In 1937, German and Italian planes bombed the Basque town of Guernica, killing an estimated 1,000 civilians. This foreshadowed the much larger strategic bombing campaigns that would come in World War II.
When WWII broke out in 1939, President Roosevelt initially urged Germany, France and Britain not to bomb cities and kill civilians. All sides initially agreed, but this pact quickly broke down. Germany began bombing British cities in 1940 in what became known as the Blitz, killing over 40,000 civilians.
Britain retaliated with its own strategic bombing campaign against German cities starting in 1942. Over the next three years, British air raids killed around 300,000 German civilians. The United States also embraced strategic bombing, with a single firebombing raid on Tokyo in March 1945 killing an estimated 100,000 Japanese civilians in one night.
This escalation of attacks on civilian populations set the stage for the even more devastating nuclear attacks to come. The logic of total war had taken hold, erasing the traditional distinction between combatants and innocent civilians.
The Manhattan Project and the Dawn of the Nuclear Age
As a young student in the 1940s, Ellsberg first encountered speculation about city-destroying nuclear weapons in science fiction stories and scientific journals. He and his classmates concluded that such weapons would be unstable, easily abused, and disastrous for humanity.
Little did they know that the top-secret Manhattan Project was already racing to develop the atomic bomb. In 1939, scientists had achieved the first controlled nuclear fission reaction, splitting uranium atoms and releasing enormous energy. Hungarian-German physicist Leo Szilard immediately grasped the terrifying implications - this discovery could lead to weapons of unprecedented destructive power.
Despite these misgivings, work on the atomic bomb proceeded, driven by fears that Nazi Germany might develop the weapon first. The scientists rationalized their work as creating a deterrent against a totalitarian regime. They did not foresee that their creation would be used against Japan in 1945 and spark a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union.
This pattern of justifying nuclear weapons development as a necessary deterrent would shape Cold War strategy for decades to come. Even as the destructive power of these weapons grew to apocalyptic levels, strategists clung to the belief that preparing for nuclear war was the best way to prevent it.
Ellsberg Joins RAND and Learns About Deterrence
In 1957, at age 26, Daniel Ellsberg began working as a nuclear strategist at the RAND Corporation, a think tank conducting research for the U.S. Air Force. He and his colleagues believed their work could help save the world from nuclear destruction.
Ellsberg arrived at RAND during a volatile period in the nuclear arms race. Just weeks after he started, the U.S. learned that the Soviet Union had successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching American soil. A month later, the USSR launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite, demonstrating their ability to deliver nuclear warheads across vast distances.
These developments meant that for the first time, the United States was vulnerable to a surprise nuclear attack that could arrive in just 30 minutes. This new reality lent urgency to RAND's work on nuclear strategy.
The core of U.S. nuclear policy was the doctrine of deterrence. The idea was that to prevent a Soviet nuclear attack, the U.S. had to maintain the ability to launch a devastating counterattack even after absorbing a first strike. If the Soviets knew that any attack would lead to their own destruction, they would be deterred from ever launching their weapons.
In theory, this mutual vulnerability would create a stable situation where neither side would ever actually use their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear war would become unthinkable.
Ellsberg initially found the logic of deterrence compelling. If it worked as intended, it could prevent nuclear war and save millions of lives. However, as he delved deeper into the details of nuclear planning, he began to discover alarming flaws in the system.
Flaws in the Nuclear Command Structure
Ellsberg spent long hours analyzing every aspect of U.S. nuclear command and control systems. What he found shocked him and revealed major vulnerabilities.
One key issue was that the nuclear command structure prioritized the ability to quickly launch weapons over safeguards against accidental or unauthorized launches. The overriding concern was being able to retaliate before incoming Soviet missiles could destroy U.S. nuclear forces.
This led to a system where nuclear weapons could potentially be launched without direct presidential authorization. While in theory a two-man system was in place requiring two officers to agree to launch, in practice both officers had access to the full launch codes. The two-man rule was seen as too risky in case one officer was incapacitated during a crisis.
Even more worryingly, Ellsberg discovered there was no "stop" command that could recall nuclear bombers once they were airborne. Not even the president could halt an attack once it was underway. This meant that a false alarm or hasty decision could potentially trigger an unstoppable nuclear strike.
The more Ellsberg investigated, the more he realized how fragile and accident-prone the nuclear command system really was. Far from being tightly controlled, the ability to initiate nuclear war had been delegated surprisingly far down the chain of command.
In 1959, President Eisenhower had authorized certain military commanders to launch nuclear attacks if communications with Washington were cut off. This authority had then been further delegated, to the point where numerous three-star generals potentially had the power to start a nuclear war.
Ellsberg was deeply troubled by these discoveries. The nuclear arsenal was far less secure and controlled than the public realized. The very systems meant to prevent nuclear war could potentially make it more likely due to accident or miscalculation.
Ellsberg's Efforts to Improve Nuclear Safety
Alarmed by the vulnerabilities he had uncovered, Ellsberg sought to alert senior officials and improve the safety of the nuclear command system. He prepared reports detailing the flaws and risks in the existing procedures.
When Ellsberg briefed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on his findings, McNamara was stunned. Like most government leaders, he had been unaware of how far nuclear launch authority had been delegated down the chain of command.
Ellsberg was then tasked with developing recommendations for a new and improved national security policy to address these issues. His suggestions included:
A "no cities" targeting plan that would focus strikes on military targets rather than population centers if deterrence failed. The hope was this would deter the Soviets from attacking U.S. and allied cities in return.
Protecting U.S. reserve nuclear forces to ensure a surviving command structure that could negotiate an end to the war and avoid complete annihilation.
Creating a "stop" command to allow attacks in progress to be recalled or aborted.
In May 1961, the Kennedy administration approved Ellsberg's recommendations, which went on to significantly influence U.S. nuclear strategy. However, the fundamental risks of accidental war or escalation remained.
The Horrifying Scale of a Nuclear Exchange
Despite efforts to make nuclear war more "limited" and controllable, Ellsberg came to realize that any major nuclear exchange would be an unprecedented catastrophe for humanity.
In 1961, Ellsberg obtained a classified estimate of casualties from a U.S. nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union and China. The numbers were staggering:
- 275 million dead within the first two hours
- 325 million dead within six months
- Another 100 million deaths in Eastern Europe
- Potential Soviet retaliation could bring the total to 1 billion deaths - one third of the world's population at the time
Even more chilling, these estimates did not account for the long-term effects of nuclear winter, a phenomenon only theorized in the 1980s. The global cooling caused by smoke and soot from nuclear firestorms could potentially kill most of the world's remaining population through agricultural collapse and famine.
Ellsberg realized that the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and USSR had become true "doomsday machines" capable of ending human civilization. The very existence of these weapons, regardless of intentions, posed an existential threat to humanity.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: Nuclear War Averted by Chance
In October 1962, the world came perilously close to nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. When the U.S. discovered Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, it imposed a naval blockade to prevent further shipments. As Soviet ships approached the blockade, tensions escalated to the brink of war.
At the height of the crisis, the U.S. put 1,500 nuclear bombers on high alert - the first time such preparations for nuclear war had ever been made. Both sides' nuclear forces were poised for launch.
Ellsberg reveals how close the world truly came to disaster. On one Soviet submarine approaching the U.S. blockade, two of the three officers with launch authority wanted to fire a nuclear torpedo, believing war had already begun. Only the dissent of the third officer, Vasili Arkhipov, prevented a nuclear launch that likely would have triggered full-scale war.
Neither U.S. President Kennedy nor Soviet leader Khrushchev wanted the crisis to escalate to nuclear war. Both were willing to make concessions to avoid that outcome. But the fate of humanity came down to the decision of a single Soviet submarine officer.
The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated how nuclear war could be triggered by miscalculation or unauthorized action, even against the wishes of national leaders. The world had survived, but largely due to luck rather than the stability of deterrence.
The Continuing Danger of Doomsday Machines
While the imminent danger of the Cold War has receded, Ellsberg argues that the threat of accidental nuclear war remains unacceptably high. The U.S. and Russia still maintain large nuclear arsenals on high alert, ready to launch on warning of an attack.
This creates an ongoing risk of accidental war triggered by false alarms, cyber attacks, or unauthorized action. Even a limited regional nuclear war could potentially cause global climate effects that would devastate agriculture worldwide.
Ellsberg calls for dismantling these hair-trigger "doomsday machine" systems, even if some nuclear weapons are retained. Taking missiles off alert and instituting stronger safeguards could greatly reduce the risk of accidental apocalypse.
However, powerful political and institutional forces resist such changes. Both Republican and Democratic administrations have supported maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent. The military-industrial complex that has grown up around nuclear weapons also lobbies to sustain these systems.
The Need for Greater Public Awareness
Ellsberg argues that increased public awareness and pressure is needed to address the ongoing nuclear danger. Most people do not realize how vulnerable humanity remains to accidental nuclear war or how flawed command and control systems continue to be.
He calls for:
- Raising public awareness about the risks of nuclear winter and accidental war
- Pressuring Congress to investigate current nuclear war plans and fail-safe measures
- Encouraging whistleblowers to release information about nuclear vulnerabilities
- Building a mass movement to demand disarmament and dismantling of doomsday systems
While the task seems daunting, Ellsberg points to historical examples like the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union or the end of apartheid in South Africa as evidence that seemingly impossible changes can occur. With sustained effort, even deeply entrenched systems can be reformed or abolished.
Key Takeaways
The origins of nuclear strategy lie in the strategic bombing campaigns of WWII that erased the distinction between military and civilian targets.
Early nuclear planners believed preparing for nuclear war was the best way to prevent it, but this led to the creation of hair-trigger "doomsday machine" systems.
Command and control of nuclear weapons has often been less secure than publicly portrayed, with launch authority delegated surprisingly far down the chain of command.
Any major nuclear exchange would likely end human civilization through immediate destruction and long-term climate effects.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the fate of humanity came down to the decision of a single Soviet submarine officer.
While the Cold War has ended, the danger of accidental nuclear war remains unacceptably high due to maintained alert levels and flawed command systems.
Dismantling these doomsday machines is crucial for human survival but faces significant political and institutional resistance.
Increased public awareness and grassroots pressure is needed to address the ongoing nuclear danger and push for disarmament.
Conclusion
Daniel Ellsberg's "The Doomsday Machine" is a stark warning from someone who was at the heart of U.S. nuclear war planning. It reveals how the cold logic of deterrence led to the creation of apocalyptic arsenals that continue to threaten humanity's existence.
Ellsberg shows that the nuclear danger was and remains far greater than the public realizes. Command and control systems have been vulnerable to accident, false alarms, and unauthorized action. The destructive power of these weapons makes any major usage an existential threat to civilization.
While the imminent danger of the Cold War has passed, thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert. The risk of accidental war or escalation during a crisis is still unacceptably high. Ellsberg argues passionately that these doomsday machines must be dismantled to ensure humanity's long-term survival.
This book is a powerful call to action, making clear that the nuclear threat is not a relic of history but an ongoing danger that demands our attention. Ellsberg challenges us to build a mass movement for disarmament and more responsible nuclear policies before it is too late.
By revealing the inner workings of nuclear war planning, Ellsberg hopes to spark greater public awareness and involvement in these issues of existential importance. He shows that the fate of humanity remains in the balance, but that change is possible if we have the will to demand it.
"The Doomsday Machine" is essential reading for anyone concerned about the future of our world. It is a gripping insider account, a thoughtful analysis of nuclear strategy, and an urgent plea to address the gravest threat facing humanity. Ellsberg's unique perspective and moral clarity make this one of the most important books on nuclear dangers in recent years.