James Forman Jr.'s "Locking Up Our Own" is a thought-provoking exploration of the complex history behind the disproportionate incarceration of Black Americans. The book delves into the period from the 1970s to the 1990s, examining how decisions made by Black leaders in Washington, D.C., inadvertently contributed to the mass incarceration of their own community. Forman's work provides a nuanced perspective on the war on drugs, gun control, and policing policies that have shaped the criminal justice system in America.
Introduction
The Black Lives Matter movement, which gained prominence in 2013 following the acquittal of George Zimmerman for the killing of Trayvon Martin, brought renewed attention to the issue of racial inequality in the American justice system. However, the roots of this struggle stretch back decades before the age of social media.
Forman's book takes us on a journey through the history of judicial decisions in Washington, D.C., starting from the 1970s. It explores how the introduction and amendments to gun and drug laws played a significant role in the incarceration of Black men. By examining the flaws and limitations of past actions, the author aims to provide insights that can help address the ongoing disparity in the criminalization of Black and white individuals.
The Marijuana Reform Act of 1975
In 1975, Washington, D.C., had a Black mayor and a predominantly Black city council, reflecting the city's 70% Black population. That same year, a decision was made that would have long-lasting consequences for young Black males.
Proposals were put forward to soften marijuana-related legislation due to concerns about racial injustice. At the time, 80% of those arrested for marijuana possession were Black, and these arrests had lifelong consequences, affecting housing, education, and employment opportunities. On March 18, 1975, city council member David Clarke proposed the Marijuana Reform Act, which aimed to reduce penalties for marijuana possession to a fine and citation.
However, the Black community, led by council member Doug Moore, opposed the proposal. They argued that easing penalties would make it easier for Black people to fall into crime and addiction. This opposition proved successful, and on October 21, 1975, the Reform Act was tabled.
To understand the reasoning behind this opposition, we need to look back at the heroin epidemic of the 1960s. In the early to mid-1960s, less than 3% of new prisoners at the Central Detention Facility in Washington were heroin addicts. However, by June 1969, this figure had skyrocketed to 45%, with the majority being young Black men.
There was a strong correlation between heroin addiction and crime. Addicts often resorted to criminal activities to fund their drug habits. One study found that heroin addicts in D.C. and three other U.S. cities committed an average of more than 300 crimes annually.
This spike in criminal activity led to outrage across Black communities. Black drug dealers were seen as betraying their race, and some even believed that Black heroin addicts and their passive dependence benefited the white community. In May 1969, posters comparing heroin addiction to slavery appeared across D.C., printed by the antidrug organization Blackman's Development Center.
Gun Control Laws of 1975
While the city council was debating marijuana penalties, gun violence was on the rise. In 1974, it became the leading cause of death for males under 40 in Washington. This surge led to discussions about stricter gun control measures.
Councilman John Wilson proposed banning the sale, purchase, and possession of all shotguns and handguns, as well as increasing maximum sentencing guidelines for gun crimes. He also suggested introducing minimum sentencing times to ensure more offenders would go to jail.
Wilson's proposals gained support from gun-related crime victims and citizens angered by the fact that 85% of those killed by guns were Black. However, councilman Moore opposed the suggestions, arguing that guns were essential for the Black community to protect themselves against street criminals and racism-fueled violence.
In 1976, the council passed stricter gun control laws, with everyone in favor except Moore. Although not as strict as Wilson's original proposals, the new laws banned further gun sales and mandated the registration of existing ones.
Many Black citizens supported the new laws, partly due to the perception that Black-on-Black street crime had become a greater threat to the community than racist violence. The stricter gun laws could be seen as a significant civil rights victory, with Black policymakers passing legislation aimed at protecting Black lives.
However, the policy change wasn't as effective as many had hoped. The new laws and penalties primarily punished poorly educated Black men from low-income households while failing to protect the larger Black community against gun violence. This was likely due to an overemphasis on punishment rather than addressing the root causes of gun crimes, such as racial inequality in healthcare, education, and employment.
The Rise of Black Police Officers
Throughout most of U.S. history, racism prevented Black people from being considered for positions of authority, especially in police departments. Significant efforts were required to increase the number of Black people on the police force.
In the late 1940s, Black civilians started joining the police force. However, segregation existed in patrol cars, and Black officers didn't have equal career tracks. Promotions required good written test scores and high "suitability for promotion" ratings from supervisors. Racism often prevented Black officers from receiving good suitability ratings, making promotions nearly impossible.
Two Black officers, Burtell Jefferson and Tilmon O'Bryant, formed a covert class for Black officers in 1958 to help them achieve high test scores and compensate for low suitability ratings. After six months, 12 out of 15 officers in the class scored high enough on the test to receive promotions.
While this was an important step forward for Black policing, having more Black officers didn't necessarily reduce police violence against Black citizens. For example, in October 1968, Elijah Bennett was shot by a white police officer after being verbally reprimanded for jaywalking in a predominantly Black neighborhood in D.C.
Furthermore, Black officers weren't always more sympathetic toward Black citizens. A 1966 University of Michigan study found that while Black officers weren't as prejudiced as white ones, 28% of them were still classified as "prejudiced" or "highly prejudiced."
One reason for this high percentage was class divisions. Officers often perceived poor Black people as a threat to law and order in Black communities. In some cases, this concern led to overzealousness and the use of excessive force for minor offenses like loitering and drunkenness.
Changes in Drug Crime Sentencing
From the late 1930s onward, all drug crimes in Washington received a minimum one-year sentence, with repeat offenses resulting in ten years behind bars. However, by the 1970s, drug dealing was still rampant in the city.
In March 1981, the city council passed new drug-related legislation. David Clarke, chairman of the council's Judiciary Committee, proposed categorizing drugs into groups with specific penalties. Marijuana dealers would receive a maximum one-year sentence, while cocaine and heroin dealers would face up to five and ten years, respectively. This proposal was a response to public perception that the legal system was a revolving door for criminals.
African-American councilmember John Ray opposed Clarke's proposal with a stricter one, seeking to raise maximum sentences even further to three, ten, and 15 years for marijuana, cocaine, and heroin dealing, respectively. Ray also proposed mandatory minimum sentences for gun and drug offenses. The council approved Ray's higher maximum sentences but rejected his minimum sentencing proposal.
However, a ballot in January 1982 established mandatory minimum sentences for drug dealing. Initiative 9 mandated that anyone convicted of dealing heroin would get a minimum of four years in prison, while selling cocaine or marijuana would result in two years and one year in prison, respectively.
Ray and police chief Burtell Jefferson strongly supported this initiative, capitalizing on citizens' outrage over the booming drug market. They campaigned by visiting murder scenes to demonstrate the severity of D.C.'s crime problem. On September 14, 1982, Initiative 9 won by a landslide.
Although the policy had no impact on crime reduction, drug-related prosecutions increased by nearly 300% between 1982 and 1984.
The Crack Epidemic and "Warrior Policing"
By the late 1980s, the war on drugs was in full swing, and police were trained as though they were soldiers going into battle. This led to the rise of "warrior policing," an aggressive form of law enforcement that saw young people from high-crime neighborhoods as potential enemies who could attack at any moment.
This approach contradicted the U.S. Constitution's "innocent until proven guilty" principle. The author's students had to constantly be mindful of their clothing, speech, and behavior to avoid appearing guilty. One student even explained that he couldn't study during his commute to school because he needed to remain vigilant against harassment or attacks.
Warrior policing emerged as a response to the crack cocaine epidemic. Crack cocaine, made by heating cocaine with baking soda and water, creates an intense and highly addictive high. In 1984, 15% of people arrested by D.C. police tested positive for cocaine. Three years later, that percentage had grown to 60%, with nearly all of them having smoked crack.
The Black community experienced the devastating effects of crack firsthand, with a representative from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People calling it "the worst thing to hit us since slavery."
Due to growing fear of the drug, many members of the Black community supported heavy-handed policing. Drug-related violence was on the rise, and drug cartels and heavily armed street gangs were becoming more prevalent. The violence was far from evenly distributed – in 1989, 90% of homicide victims in Washington, D.C., were Black.
The "Stop and Search" Tactic
By 1995, incidents of violence in D.C. had started to decline after peaking during the crack epidemic. However, homicide rates were still three times higher than in 1985. On January 13 of that year, Eric Holder, the African-American U.S. attorney for Washington, D.C., pointed out that 94% of Black victims were murdered by another Black person.
As a solution to rising homicide rates, Holder introduced Operation Ceasefire, which made "stop and search" an official police policy. The program leveraged the city's numerous traffic regulations, giving police an excuse to stop almost any vehicle and search for illegal weapons.
However, studies showed that only 1-5% of these searches resulted in weapons being seized, meaning that a large proportion of innocent citizens were stopped for no justifiable reason. Another problem with Operation Ceasefire was that it disproportionately affected Black neighborhoods.
The program did not apply to the city's Second District, one of D.C.'s more prosperous, predominantly white neighborhoods, due to its low rate of gun violence. Because police officers frequented Black neighborhoods, Black drivers were significantly more likely to be stopped. These stops often resulted in arrests for crimes unrelated to guns, such as drug possession, despite the fact that Black drivers weren't more likely to possess drugs than white drivers.
This disparity didn't surprise Holder. He knew from the beginning that young Black men would be stopped more frequently, especially those in poor areas. Between 1996 and 1997, sociologist Ronald Weitzer found that people living in lower-class Black areas were four to seven times more likely to report pretextual stops and police abuse than those living in middle-class Black areas.
The "stop and search" tactic became another component of the war on drugs that only increased the imprisonment of Black people.
Conclusion: The Unintended Consequences of Well-Intentioned Policies
James Forman Jr.'s "Locking Up Our Own" provides a thought-provoking examination of how legislation enacted as part of the war on drugs in Washington, D.C., resulted in higher rates of police violence and incarceration that disproportionately affected Black people. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of this history is that the Black community itself often appealed for stricter penalties for many crimes.
The book highlights several key policy changes and new laws implemented since the mid-1970s that not only failed to reduce crime rates but also helped to further marginalize Black people:
- The rejection of the Marijuana Reform Act in 1975, which could have reduced penalties for marijuana possession.
- The implementation of stricter gun control laws in 1976, which primarily punished poorly educated Black men from low-income households.
- The increase in Black police officers, which didn't necessarily lead to a reduction in police violence against Black citizens.
- The introduction of harsher drug crime sentencing in the early 1980s, including mandatory minimum sentences.
- The rise of "warrior policing" in response to the crack cocaine epidemic of the late 1980s.
- The implementation of "stop and search" tactics through Operation Ceasefire in 1995, which disproportionately affected Black neighborhoods.
Forman's work serves as a cautionary tale about the unintended consequences of well-intentioned policies. It demonstrates how efforts to address crime and drug abuse within the Black community inadvertently contributed to the mass incarceration of Black Americans. The book challenges readers to consider the complex interplay of race, class, and politics in shaping criminal justice policies and their impact on marginalized communities.
By examining these historical decisions and their outcomes, "Locking Up Our Own" encourages us to think critically about current and future approaches to criminal justice reform. It emphasizes the need for policies that address the root causes of crime and drug abuse, such as racial inequality in healthcare, education, and employment, rather than focusing solely on punishment.
Ultimately, Forman's book serves as a reminder that the path to true justice and equality requires a nuanced understanding of history, a willingness to confront uncomfortable truths, and a commitment to addressing systemic issues rather than relying on quick fixes. As we continue to grapple with issues of racial inequality in the criminal justice system, the lessons from "Locking Up Our Own" provide valuable insights for policymakers, activists, and citizens alike in the ongoing struggle for a more just and equitable society.